This paper examines the effects on UK audit market concentration and pricing of mergers between the large audit firms and the demise of Andersen. Based on data over the period [1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002], it appears that mergers contributed to a rise in concentration ratios to levels that suggest concern about the potential for monopoly pricing. The high concentration ratios have not improved the level of price competition in the UK audit market. Our pooled models suggest that concentration ratios are associated with higher audit fees. The evidence suggests that the effects of mergers between big firms on brand name fee premium and on price competition vary depending on the particular circumstances. The brand name premium is strongest for the largest quartile of companies prior to the mergers. After the Big Six mergers, the premium increases for average-sized companies but falls for the smallest and largest companies. Following the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, the premium increases for below median-sized clients but decreases for above median sized clients. For the Deloitte-Andersen transaction, the premium falls for the smallest and largest companies but increases for those in the second quartile. Our results provide evidence that auditees are likely to pay higher fees if their auditor merges with a larger counterpart. We attribute merger-related fee hikes to product differentiation, rather than anticompetitive pricing.
Introduction
A large number of audit firms have combined in the UK since the 1980s. Table 1 shows that the various mergers and the demise of Andersen have reduced the number of first-tier accounting firms (hereafter Big Firms) from eight in 1985 to four in 2002.
Industrial economists use the structure-conduct-performance paradigm to urge regulators to be wary of reductions in the number of suppliers. -Insert Table 1 about hereThis study contributes to the literature by testing the effect of structural changes in the market for audit services on concentration and the pricing of the audits of UK listed companies. The UK provides an interesting empirical setting for a number of reasons. UK companies have long reported audit fee information in their annual financial statements (Companies Act 1967), making it possible to carry out a longitudinal study that is not yet possible in the US 2 . Furthermore, the London market is one of the world's largest, making it easier to test theories of audit pricing than in small markets like Hong Kong. We have exploited these institutional features to 2 US firms have only been required to disclose the fees paid to auditors in statements filed on or after 5 February 2001 (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000) . Researchers using US data have therefore had to focus on measures like the number of audits, clients' turnover or clients' asset values as the measurement base because of the lack of available audit fee data (Moizer and Turley, 1989: 42) .
conduct a more comprehensive study over a longer time frame than in the prior literature.
We find that the largest increases in concentration ratios coincided with Big
Firm mergers in 1989 , 1990 and 1997 , concentration ratios reached levels that are consistent with a market structure of just over four equal sized firms, exceeding levels normally associated with a tight oligopoly. These structural changes appear to have had a variable effect on audit fees. There is some evidence to suggest that the high concentration ratios have reduced the level of price competition, an effect that may be attributed to product differentiation. The ability of large audit firms to charge a brand premium might be a function of willingness to pay. This might be expected to be stronger for larger clients, and this is what we observe in the 1985-1988 period before the mergers. However, the pattern is more complex in the later part of our sample period. Our findings indicate that the brand name premium increased for average-sized companies (i.e., those in the second and third size quartiles) after the Big Six mergers but fell for the smallest and the largest companies.
Following the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, the brand name premium increased (decreased) for clients whose size is below the median (above the median). The picture is even more complex following the Andersen transaction -the premium fell for the smallest and largest client quartiles but increased for those in the second quartile. We attribute these findings to the Big Firms engaging in a product differentiation strategy. Our findings using nominal prices indicate that the 1989 merger raised the audit fees of Arthur Young clients relative to the same clients previously audited by Ernst and Whinney 3 and the 1990 merger increased the Coopers 3 The UK combination between Arthur Young and Ernst and Whinney on 1 September 1989 was officially a merger but was seen by some writers as a takeover by Ernst and Whinney because several of the previously high-ranking Arthur Young partners left the following year. This anecdotal evidence and Lybrand fee premium over Deloitte 4 . The 1997 merger reduced the size of the nominal fee discount offered by Price Waterhouse relative to Coopers and Lybrand.
Up to the end of our sample period the 2002 transaction had no material effect on the nominal audit fees of Deloitte and Andersen former clients. Using inflation adjusted audit fees, we find that Coopers and Lybrand and Ernst and Young clients paid higher real audit fees relative to clients of the benchmark firm (KPMG). On the other hand, Andersen clients paid lower real audit fees in the run up to being forced out of business. This audit firm transaction is significantly different from the others because the Enron debacle left a stigma not present in other mergers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the extant literature. Section three outlines the research design. The data collection procedures are explained in section four. The results are presented in section five and a summary is provided in section six.
Prior Research
Industrial economists argue that market structure is intrinsically linked to firm behaviour and financial performance (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Martin, 1994) .
Scholars urge regulators to be wary of the pricing effects of merger-induced increases in market concentration (Stigler, 1968: 30; Gist and Michaels, 1995: 233; Romeo, suggests that Ernst and Whinney had a stronger brand name reputation than Arthur Young (supporting the evidence of the fee regressions). 4 The Deloitte case provides an exclusive opportunity to examine the effects of brand name. (Moizer, 2005:4) .
1999: 62). 5 There is considerable evidence that audit market concentration has increased over time in the UK (Briston and Kedslie, 1984; Moizer and Turley, 1989; Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; Pong, 1999) and in other countries (Zeff and Fossum, 1967; Rhode et al, 1974; Hermanson et al., 1987; Wolk et al., 2001 ). Beattie and Fearnley (1994: 308) contend that, 'auditor concentration in the UK market for listed audit services has now almost reached the limit of a tight oligopoly, which is a market structure characterised by few rivals, stable market shares and medium to high entry The extant literature on the effect of mergers on the economy is mixed (Francis et al., 1999) . Consumer welfare will increase if mergers reduce marginal costs, create efficiencies and enhance product differentiation but will decrease if mergers enable tacit collusion over prices or if unilateral anticompetitive effects arise from non-tacit price collusion (Sullivan, 2002: 381-384) . Concerns about the welfare implications of the 1989/90 mergers (Wootton et al. 1994: 58-59) were quietened by the lack of opposition from the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the Office of Fair Trading in the UK and the Department of Justice in the USA, and by evidence that auditors significantly cut fees to win audits in the 1980s (Simunic, 1980; Francis and Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Gregory 5 Moizer and Turley (1989: 41) define concentration as 'the extent to which a relatively small number of audit firms account for a significant proportion of the total audit work carried out. ' and Collier, 1996). 6 Although Pong (2004) documents a 17.5% reduction in inflationadjusted UK audit fees from 1991 to 1995, there has been little recent work that has addressed this issue. This lack of evidence, and the structural changes resulting from the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger and the demise of Andersen, have rekindled concerns about the competitiveness of the audit market (Hermanson et al., 1987; Gist and Michaels, 1995; Pong, 1998; Willekens and Achmadi, 2003) [1991] [1992] [1993] , but this premium subsequently disappears. Iyer and Iyer (1996) compared the UK audit fees earned by 6 Opinion surveys have yielded results consistent with this research. One survey by the City Research Group found that 81% of the financial executives surveyed by the City Research Group questioning the audit fee (Anonymous, December 1991: 11) . Another survey showed that 61% of the accountant respondents thought that 'discounting audit fees was widespread' (Lea, 1991) . The leaked Price Waterhouse tender that allegedly included a £900,000 discount was also the subject of press comment (Plender, 1991) .
Big Eight firms in 1987 with Big Six firms in 1991. Although concentration levels increased over the period, there was no evidence of any associated significant increase in audit fees. Firth and Lau (2004) examine the effect of accounting firm mergers on audit fees using a sample of Hong Kong companies. Their paper investigates the effect of a merger on any audit fee premium that existed before the combination. They find that the size of the premium earned by a brand name firm (Deloitte Touche and Tohmatsu) over a non-brand name firm (Kwan Wong Tan and Fong) fell from 55% before the merger to 34% shortly after the merger. In contrast, there was no change in the audit fee premium earned by two brand name firms (Price Waterhouse and
Coopers and Lybrand) after the merger. These results suggest that pre-merger premiums of the brand name auditor pass to the other auditor after a merger but do not transfer for re-branding amongst international firms.
Research Design
The present study contributes to this literature by testing the effects of the 1989/90
Big Six mergers, the 1997 merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand and the 2002 Deloitte-Andersen transaction on audit pricing in the UK. We start our analysis by estimating concentration ratios to assess the potential for monopoly pricing in the audit market. Consistent with prior work, we define audit activity based on the number of audit clients each audit firm has and the firm's audit fee revenue (Wootton et. al., 1994; Pong, 1998 Pong, , 1999 Wolk et. al., 2001) . We use the concentration ratio (CR) and Herfindahl Index (H) 7 because these are widely used by 7 The concentration ratio (CR) measures the percentage of the total activity (e.g. number of clients or size of audit fees) that is accounted for by the largest firms as follows:
academics and regulators such as the US Department of Justice (Utton, 1970; Briston and Kedslie, 1984; Moizer and Turley, 1989; Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; Pong, 1999) . CR and H are descriptive statistics that prima facie suggest whether one should be concerned about the potential for anti-competitive pricing in the audit market. A positive result leads us to investigate whether the UK audit market has become more monopolistic following the accounting firm mergers. Our analysis focuses on the mergers between international accounting firms because these combinations are fewer in number and are likely to have a larger impact on market structure and conduct than those taking place between smaller firms.
Empirical Questions
The central issue is the effect of the big firm mergers on audit pricing, which we sum up in the following question: Mergers can improve consumer welfare by creating efficiencies or decrease consumer welfare by creating conditions conducive to monopoly pricing (Sullivan, 2002: 381-384) . Simunic (1980) argues that some segments of the market could be more competitive than others; this could have an impact on the effects of the mergers on audit pricing. We follow this line of thought by using the small client market as the where n is the number of large audit firms and S i is the size of audit firm i as a percentage of the size of the market. This study uses the N-firm concentration ratio (CR n ) to examine the dominance of the eight (1985-1989), six (1990-1996), five (1997-1999) and four (2000) (2001) (2002) largest accounting firms over medium and small firms. Consistent with prior studies (Briston and Kedslie, 1984; Moizer and Turley, 1989; Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; Pong, 1999) , we also use the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) to express the percentage of the total activity that is accounted for by the leading four firms in the market. One limitation of these measures is that they pay little attention to the number and size of other firms in the market. The Herfindahl Index (H) provides a more comprehensive measure (Utton, 1970: 35-51; Moizer and Turley, 1989: 44; Pong, 1999: 455) :
where, M is the total number of (big and small) firms in the audit market and S i is the size of audit firm i as a percentage of the size of the entire market. competitive benchmark and testing whether fees change around the time of the mergers. In other words, we test whether the mergers have enabled the brand name firms to pass on any cost savings associated with efficiencies to their clients in the form of a reduction in the assumed audit fee premium or allowed the Big Firms to use their power or reputation to increase the audit fee premium. This empirical question is tested by running a quality differentiation regression across sub-samples of clients partitioned by total assets in the periods surrounding the combinations:
where LAF is the natural logarithm of total audit fees (£'000); Brand, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is a brand name firm and zero otherwise;
Controls is a vector of control variables capturing audit fee determinants identified in the prior literature (e.g. Francis and Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Beatty, 1993; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994) as follows: LTA = natural logarithm of total assets (£'M); Sub = square root of the number of subsidiaries; Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Loss = 1 if an operating loss was reported in any 1 of the prior 3 years, 0 otherwise; Quick = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; DTA = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; YE = 1 if the accounting year end is between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; and ε 1,i is the regression residual. The control variables are designed to capture effort-related variation in audit fees (LTA), litigation risk (DTA, ROI, Current and Quick) and complexity (Sub, Foreign).
The second issue we address concerns the effects of a merger on audit fees charged by specific audit firms around the time of the merger. There is a considerable body of theory and evidence suggesting that the large accounting firms have differentiated themselves from smaller competitors on the basis of perceptions of quality and that they are able to attract premium fees for their investment in a brand name reputation (e.g. Francis and Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Beatty, 1993; McMeeking et al, 2006) . A possible motive for smaller accounting firms to merge with larger ones is that it is expected that the clients of the smaller partner will be willing to pay more because of perceptions that the quality of the service provided will have increased as a result of the merger. This is most likely to take place when the disparity in size is marked. However, an interesting question is whether it also arises when both merger parties are large. In such circumstances, fees may rise due to market forces or product differentiation or fall due to economies of scale and/or scope (Francis, et. al., 1999) . This leads us to our second research question:
EQ2: What are the fee effects for clients of audit firms merging with larger audit firms?
We test EQ2 in two ways. First, we run panel audit fee regressions for the subsample of companies whose auditors were involved in mergers. Following Firth and Lau (2004), we examine audit pricing over three time intervals: three years before the merger; the year of the merger, and three years subsequent to the merger. For the first three mergers, we also examine pricing over different event windows because the choice of appropriate window is not obvious, a priori. For the Deloitte-Andersen transaction, in 2002 we use only one post-transaction observation because of the lack of available data at the time of collection. Audit fee differences between the combining firms are captured using a series of dummy variables. As before, LAF is the natural logarithm of total audit fees (£'000) and includes both pre-and post-merger observations; EWpre, PostEY, EYmerge, CLpre, PostCLD, CLDmerge, PWpre, PostPWC, PWCmerge, DTpre, PostD and Dmerge are 9 We exclude clients of other auditors who switched to the combined Ernst and Young firm after the merger and pre-merger clients of either Arthur Young or Ernst and Whinney who defected to other audit firms. A problem with this design is that we might observe fee cutting by the non-defecting clients caused by their demanding a reward for staying loyal. This does not, however, affect what is of primary interest in our study, namely, the relative changes in the fees of clients of the combining audit firms. As we explain later, our models estimated across the full sample of audit clients circumvent the latter problem. dichotomous treatment variables. EWpre is set equal to 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor is Ernst and Whinney; if the auditor prior to the merger is Arthur Young or the observation is after the merger then EWpre is 0. PostEY is set equal to 1 for a post-merger observation and 0 otherwise. EYmerge is set equal to 1 for a post-merger observation where the client was originally audited by Ernst and Whinney and 0 otherwise. CLpre is set equal to 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor at that time is Coopers and Lybrand and 0 otherwise. PostCLD is set equal to 1 for a post-merger observation and 0 otherwise. CLDmerge is set equal to 1 if the observation is after the merger and the original auditor was Coopers and Lybrand and zero otherwise. PWpre is set equal to 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor at that time is Price Waterhouse and 0 otherwise. PostPWC is set equal to 1 for a post-merger observation and 0 otherwise. PWCmerge is set equal to 1 if the observation is after the merger and the original auditor was Price Waterhouse and zero otherwise. DTpre is set equal to 1 if the observation is prior to the transaction and the auditor at that time is Deloitte Touche and 0 otherwise. PostD is set equal to 1 for a post-takeover observation and 0 otherwise. Finally, Dmerge is set equal to 1 if the observation is after the transaction and the original auditor was Deloitte Touche and zero otherwise. The first subscript, 2, signifies that the regression is based on equation (2), the second subscript, i, refers to firm-year, ε 2,i is the regression residual and Controls is the vector of the same control variables as specified for model 1. One limitation of the Firth and Lau (2004) methodology is that mergerinduced audit fee changes cannot be distinguished from fee variations across the entire audit market. We circumvent this problem by testing audit pricing for the clients of the firms involved in the four mergers and those that were excluded from merger activity. We do this by running a pooled model that contains the previous control variables, a non-brand name firm dummy and dichotomous variables indicating whether the observations relate to a firm that was involved in the mergers.
The advantages of this design is that it controls for omitted factors that might confound the results and allows one to see how any merger related premium varies vis-à-vis the firm that was not involved in merger activity with one of its international counterparts (KPMG). One problem with running a pooled estimation across the extended (1985 to 2002) time frame is that audit fees may increase significantly due to the effects of general price inflation. Following Pong (2004) , we account for inflationary driven audit fee changes using measures of the retail price index to adjust the nominal audit fees into real audit fees based on the month of the company's financial year-end. Differences in real audit fees are captured using the following model:
. 
LRAF is the natural logarithm of real (inflation adjusted) audit fees (£'000) and other variables are as defined before (see Table 2 ).
-Insert Table 2 about here-
Data Collection
The data were taken from a population of 1,596 UK companies listed on both the Consistent with other studies, the models include logarithmic or square root transformations of the value of audit fees, total assets and subsidiaries variables, as appropriate. This mitigates the possibility that large auditees will dominate the results. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and shows how these transformation procedures reduced the extent of skewness in the distribution of the assets, debt and earnings variables.
-Insert Table 3 However, untabulated variance inflation factors were all lower than the conventional cut-off point of 10, suggesting that it is unlikely that multicollinearity materially affects our findings.
Results

Descriptive Statistics
Market share estimates based on the number of audit clients (CR n , CR4 and H) from 1985 to 2002 are reported in Table 4 . Between 1985 and 2002, CR n increased from 65% to 83%, CR4 from 45% to 80% and H from 13% to 22% based on the number of audit clients. Using the audit fee as a measurement basis, CR n increased from 77% to 95%, CR4 from 59% to 88% and H from 13% to 23% over the same period. .
As a basis of comparison, the Herfindahl findings for 2002 are equivalent to a market of just over four firms of equal size and are even larger than the levels identified in the prior UK literature (9.6%, Moizer and Turley, 1989:45; 16.97%, Pong, 1999:472) as signifying a tight oligopolistic market structure 11 . Concentration ratios increased rapidly around the time of the Big Firm mergers and reached levels in 2002 that suggest that that the potential for price collusion is high. Unreported auditor market shares across four quartiles defined by client size indicate that concentration is an increasing function of client size. The high and increasing levels of concentration based on numbers of audit clients and on fee revenues suggest that that the potential for price collusion is particularly high in the largest client segment. The issue we turn to next is the impact this industry consolidation had on the relative rankings of audit firms.
-Insert Table 4 about hereRankings of the audit firms based on estimated market share of audit fees are reported in Willekens and Achmadi (2003:441) , we compute the 5% critical levels to determine whether the market is significantly concentrated. We find that statistically significant concentration ratios are observed for CR n in 1988 and from 1992 -1998 and for CR4 in 1985 , 1986 , 1988 substantial increase in market share of PricewaterhouseCoopers following the 1997 merger helped that firm to become the leading audit firm. The Andersen transaction resulted in a revised top four comprising PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst and Young.
-Insert Table 5 about here -
Monopolistic or Competitive Pricing
We now turn our attention to the effect industry restructuring had on the pricing of audit services. The mean parameter estimates and t-statistics taken from the crosssection regressions are documented in the following tables for the areas of interest.
The t-statistics are estimated using the White (1980) procedure because there is some evidence of heteroskedasticity. We show in bold type the coefficients that are significant at the 5% level or better. In all of the regressions, the models are significant at the p<0.01 level, exhibit strong explanatory power (R 2 generally around 70%), and the control variables possess the anticipated signs and are significant at the p<0.05 level (except Loss and ROI, which are sometimes insignificant).
Since concentration levels appear to have reached record levels by the end of the sample period, we investigate whether the mergers resulted in the Big Firms charging higher audit fees than their smaller counterparts and if so whether this is due to product differentiation or monopolistic pricing. Evidence that the audit firms were charging premium fees in a saturated market segment would be of interest to regulators, because this might be a sign of anticompetitive pricing policies. We first address this possibility by running model 1 across sub-samples partitioned across the quartile values of the size of the client for the years of the Big Firm mergers and each of the sub-periods where there were 8, 6, 5 and 4 dominant accounting firms. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 6 .
-Insert Table 6 If audit firms were engaging in anticompetitive pricing strategies, we would expect to see the strongest growth in brand name premia following mergers amongst client groups most willing to pay for reputation. Our mixed results in relation to client size suggest that willingness to pay a brand premium is not an increasing function of client size. Our findings indicate that subsequent to the Big Six mergers, the brand name premium increases for mid-sized clients (i.e., those in the second and third size quartiles) but falls in the quartiles containing the smallest (competitive benchmark) and largest companies. The brand name premium also increases for clients of below median size and falls for above-average sized clients following the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger. The picture is even more complex following the Deloitte-Andersen transaction, where the premium falls for the smallest and largest client quartiles but increases for those in the second quartile. Following the combinations, the brand name premium increases for companies in the second quartile but is volatile for all other quartiles. This pattern of results appears to be more consistent with the explanation that audit firms engage in product differentiation rather than anti-competitive pricing strategies. In other words, price increases occurred only where the mergers enabled the Big Firms to create new products or services that were more appealing to particular segments of the audit market. Our results suggest that such market segmentation is only loosely related to the size of the client.
The Effect of Mergers on Audit Fees
The results obtained by estimating equation (2) for the restricted sample of audit clients of firms involved in mergers three years before, the year of and three years 12 subsequent to the combinations are documented in Table 7 . These regressions are all significant at p<0.01, have strong explanatory power (R 2 of 81%-85%) and the control variables exhibit the expected signs. The results reported in the third column of Young based on the rankings reported in Table 5 and in Moizer (2005) .
The results reported in the fourth column of The results presented in the final column of Table 7 -Insert Table 7 about hereFinally, the results of our OLS merger estimation using inflation adjusted variables for the full sample of audit clients (model 3) are documented in Table 8 .
This regression is highly significant (p<0.01), has strong explanatory power (adjusted R2 of 80%) and the control variables exhibit the expected signs. and Dpre variables are all insignificant, suggesting that they paid similar audit fees to the benchmark firm.
-Insert Table 8 about here-
Sensitivity Checks
A series of sensitivity checks were performed to test the robustness of our findings.
The results are not sensitive to the number of accounting firms used to measure concentration or the number of client size partitions created. Estimating model (1) across loss making and non-loss-making sub-samples provides a means of testing the sensitivity of the fee discounting findings to the financial performance of clients. We also sequentially excluded firms from model 1 to test whether one or a group of accounting firms might drive the results. Untabulated results indicate that the findings are not sensitive to client profitability or auditor size. We also varied the event window for model (3) using data for one, two, three and four years before and after the mergers, but results were not materially different. We tested the robustness of our findings to model specification by running the alternative estimations suggested by Firth and Lau (2004) . Finally we ran two sets of regressions for the clients of merging firms before the mergers and for the same clients after the mergers. The general finding of these sensitivity checks is that our results are not materially affected by model specification.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship between market concentration, accounting firm mergers and audit fee levels. We find that concentration ratios increased between 1985 and 2002 to levels that exceed those observed in the prior literature to form a tight oligopoly market structure. Increased levels of concentration seem to have reduced price competition and our client-sizepartitioned results suggest that this is due to product differentiation rather than anticompetitive pricing. The reduction in the number of top-tier audit firms has undoubtedly reduced auditee choice and increased the potential for conflicts of interest. The international firms have shown little signs of a willingness to de-merge their audit activities and many multinational companies do not see the mid-tier firms as a viable auditor because of their limited resources. We believe that regulators
should carefully consider what they would do in the event that one of the Big Firms failed and a large corporation was forced to retain an audit firm because of the lack of available alternatives.
We also examine whether audit fee premiums or discounts are offered by international audit firms over their rivals and whether the pre-merger fee premiums of the stronger brand name auditor spread to the other auditor after a combination. Our results indicate that there are differences both within individual firms and across different firms in the pre-and post-merger levels of real and nominal audit fees.
Looking first at nominal audit fees, we find that the Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte The study is subject to a number of limitations. In particular, caution should be exercised in assuming that these results can be generalized to apply to other countries and time periods because of differences in the structure of the markets and changes in the economic climate. Additionally, the paper might underestimate the extent of price-cutting because the auditor change variables are not able to distinguish more subtle market pressures. For example, auditor switch dummies will not identify cases where the incumbent auditor is reappointed in the tender process and any reductions will show as a fee cut by the incumbent auditor. Auditor switch dummies also cannot distinguish between efficiency gains, discounts from a normal fee and clients responding to excessively high fees by choosing to switch. Similarly, any fee reductions by the incumbent auditor resulting from pressure from the client, such as a threat to offer for tender, will not be identified. Furthermore, one is unable to generalize the results to all accounting firm mergers. We chose to focus on the pricing effects of mergers between the international accounting firms because they are likely to have a greater impact on concentration ratios and audit fees than mergers between small and medium sized firms due to their greater size and effect on market share.
One downside with this is that the identity of the firm with the superior reputation is not obvious because the audit firms concerned are similar in size and level of expertise. Finally, due to the lack of available data, we are unable to investigate the effect of mergers on auditors' charge-out rates and costs. It is therefore impossible to ascertain whether the premium fees are distributed to partners, recognised in remunerating the employees of the firm or used to cover additional unforeseen costs. Audit Fee = Fee relating to the audit (£'000); LAF = natural logarithm of the audit fee (£'000); Total Assets = Total assets (£'M); LTA = natural logarithm of total assets (£'M); Subsidiaries = Number of domestic subsidiaries; Sub = square root of the number of subsidiaries; Total Debt = Total debt (£'M); Op. profit = Operating profit (£'M); EBIT = Earnings before interest and tax (£'M); Revenue = Total sales revenue (£'000); LREV = natural logarithm of total sales revenue (£'000); Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; DTA= ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; Loss = 1 if an operating loss was reported in any one of the prior 3 years, 0 otherwise; YE = 1 if the accounting year end is between December and March, 0 otherwise. The table shows the number of large accounting firms and the mean values of the n firm concentration ratio, the four firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl index based on the number of audit clients and the fees relating to the audit of the accounting firms. The table documents a = significant at the 1% level. The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level. The first figure in each panel shows the parameter estimate and the second figure the t statistic (two-tailed) for each variable. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the audit fee. LTA= natural logarithm of total assets (£'M); Sub = square root of the number of subsidiaries; Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; DTA= ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI= ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; YE= 1 if the fiscal year end is between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; Loss = 1 if an operating loss was reported in any of the prior 3 years, 0 otherwise; EWpre = 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor is Ernst and Whinney, if the auditor prior to the merger is Arthur Young or the observation is after the merger then EWpre is 0; PostEY = 1 for a post-merger observation, 0 otherwise; EYmerge = 1 for a post-merger observation where the client was originally audited by Ernst and Whinney, 0 otherwise; CLpre = 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor at that time is Coopers and Lybrand, 0 otherwise; PostCLD = 1 for a post-merger observation, 0 otherwise; CLDmerge = 1 if the observation is after the merger and the original auditor was Coopers and Lybrand, 0 otherwise; PWpre = 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor at that time is Price Waterhouse, 0 otherwise; PostPWC = 1 for a post-merger observation, 0 otherwise; PWCmerge = 1 if the observation is after the merger and the original auditor was Price Waterhouse, 0 otherwise; DTpre = 1 if the observation is prior to the transaction and the auditor at that time is Deloitte Touche, 0 otherwise; PostD = 1 for a post-transaction observation, 0 otherwise; Dmerge = 1 if the observation is after the transaction and the original auditor was Deloitte Touche, 0 otherwise. 
